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A New Signature Scheme Based on Punctured
Reed–Muller Code With Random Insertion
Wijik Lee, Young-Sik Kim, and Jong-Seon No
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme based on a punctured Reed–Muller (RM)
code with random insertion, which improves the Goppa code-based signature scheme developed by
Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier (CFS). The CFS signature scheme has certain drawbacks in terms
of scaling of the parameters and a lack of existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message
attacks (EUF-CMA) security proof. Further, the proposed modified RM code-based signature scheme
can use complete decoding, which can be implemented using a recursive decoding method, and thus
syndromes for errors larger than the error correctability can be decoded for signing, which improves
the probability of successful signing and reduces the signing time. Using the puncturing and insertion
methods, the proposed RM code-based signature scheme can avoid some known attacks for RM code-
based cryptosystems. The parameters of the proposed signature scheme such as error weight parameter
w and the maximum signing trial N , can be adjusted in terms of signing time and security level, and
it is also proved that the proposed signature scheme achieves EUF-CMA security.
Index Terms
Code-based signature scheme, Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier (CFS) signature scheme, existential
unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-CMA), post-quantum cryptography, punc-
turing, Reed–Muller (RM) codes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As quantum computers continue to be developed, conventional public key cryptosystems such
as an RSA cryptosystem and an elliptic curve cryptosystem are expected to be broken in the near
future through the application of efficient quantum algorithms. Thus, there have been several
studies on the development of robust cryptosystems that are immune to attacks by quantum
computers, namely, post-quantum cryptography. Code-based cryptography is considered as one
of the possible candidates for post-quantum cryptography. In 1978, McEliece [1] first proposed a
code-based cryptosystem using a generator matrix of binary Goppa code, and later Niederreiter
[2] suggested another version of code-based cryptosystem using a parity check matrix based
on a syndrome decoding problem known as an NP-complete problem [3]. Many code-based
cryptosystems have since been proposed by replacing the binary Goppa code with other error
correcting codes. However, no valid code-based digital signature scheme were proposed for more
than two decades after that point.
In 2001, Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier introduced the first code-based digital signature
scheme, called the Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier (CFS) signature scheme [4]. The CFS signature
scheme is based on Niederreiter cryptosystem. In the signing process of the CFS scheme, the
hash of messageM , h(h(M)|i), is generated, and is considered as a syndrome of the given code,
where h(·) is a cryptographic hash function from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}n−k, and i is a counter value
used to adjust the hashed message corresponding to the syndrome for a valid error. Therefore, to
generate a valid signature, we need to search the corresponding error vector e whose Hamming
weight is less than or equal to the error correctability t of the code such that HeT = h(h(M)|i).
This error vector and counter i are the signature of the given message M . Clearly, finding e is a
syndrome decoding problem, and it is known that, to find a valid signature e, t! trials (increase
i, recalculate h(h(M)|i), and apply syndrome decoding to find e) are expected on average for
the case of Goppa codes in the CFS signature scheme [4], which requires a tremendously large
number of signing trials for a large t. Therefore, the CFS signature scheme is only applicable
for a relatively small t, and is thus based on a high rate Goppa code. However, it is known that
the generator matrix of a high rate Goppa code can be distinguished from a random matrix [5],
and thus the CFS scheme is not robust or existentially unforgeable against a chosen message
attack (EUF-CMA) [5].
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Thus, there have been many efforts to relieve the security problem of the CFS signature
scheme. One approach is to adopt other codes in place of the Goppa code. For example, low-
density generator matrix (LDGM) [6] and convolutional code-based signature schemes have
been proposed [7]. However, the LDGM code-based signature scheme was recently proved to be
insecure [8]. After collecting a large number of signatures, attackers can find the correlation of
signatures and can then decompose the public key H ′ = SHQ into the private keys S, H , and
Q. Another approach to relieve the security problem of the CFS signature scheme is utilizing
a modified Goppa code. Because a high rate Goppa code-based signature scheme is not secure
against EUF-CMA [5], they proposed a modified CFS scheme using an (n, k − 1) expurgated
Goppa code to evade the Goppa code distinguishing problem [9]. In general, the CFS signature
scheme has a small value of t, which causes a vulnerability to birthday attacks [10]. It is noted
that if we can use complete decoding, the decoding for errors larger than t can be possible,
which improves the security and successful signing probability.
In this paper, we propose a new variant of the CFS signature scheme based on punctured
Reed–Muller (RM) code with random insertion. The modified RM code can perform complete
decoding by utilizing a well-known and efficient recursive decoding [11], [12], called closest
coset decoding, that is, for a given received vector, the closest codeword can be found. The
closest coset decoding method does not guarantee an exact error correction, but finds an error
vector (coset leader in the standard array) corresponding to the syndrome. However, the exact
error correction is not essential for signing in code-based signature schemes, but we need to find
the error vector with the smallest Hamming weight in the coset corresponding to the syndrome.
In this respect, the RM code-based signature scheme can be considered as a solution to the
small t constrained problem of the Goppa code-based signature scheme. Further, the proposed
signature scheme can compromise the signing time and security level by adjusting the allowable
maximum Hamming weight of error vectors, called the error weight parameter w = t + δ.
However, the simple replacement of Goppa code with RM code in the CFS signature scheme
results in vulnerability to several attacks. The RM code-based McEliece cryptosystem [13] is
insecure owing to Minder–Shokrollahi attack [14] and Chizhov–Borodin attack [15]. With these
two attacks, the private keys S, G, and Q can be revealed from the public key G′ = SGQ.
These attacks can be similarly applied to the RM code-based signature scheme. It is shown
herein that punctured RM codes with random insertion can be secure against these attacks, and
November 2, 2017 DRAFT
SUBMISSION 4
an optimal puncturing scheme for preventing Minder–Shokrollahi and Chizhov–Bordin attacks
is proposed [16]. In addition, it is also shown that the punctured RM code with random insertion
is secure from a square code attack [17], which can distinguish randomly inserted columns from
the modified generator matrix. In this paper, it is also proved that the proposed modified RM
code-based signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure under the assumption that the parity check
matrix of the modified RM code is not distinguishable from a random matrix.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce conventional
CFS signature schemes, the RM code, and the punctured RM code with random insertion. In
Section III, we propose a modified CFS signature scheme based on the punctured RM code with
random insertion. Then, the security of the proposed signature scheme is presented in Section
IV. Finally, Section V provides some concluding remarks regarding this research.
II. CONVENTIONAL CODE-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the conventional code-based signature scheme (i.e., CFS signature
scheme [4]), the RM codes, and its puncturing method with random insertion.
A. CFS Signature Scheme
Courtois, Finiasz, and Sendrier proposed the first practical code-based signature scheme, called
CFS signature scheme. It is based on the Niederreiter cryptosystem and consists of three stages,
namely, key generation, signing, and verification, as follows.
Key Generation: Choose a parity check matrix H of an (n, k) binary t-error correcting
Goppa code with a decoding algorithm γ. The decoding algorithm γ will produce an error
vector e with Hamming weight of less than or equal to the error correctability t if it exists, or
output ⊥, otherwise. Let S be an (n − k) × (n − k) scrambling matrix, and Q be an n × n
permutation matrix. Construct the public key H ′ = SHQ, where S, Q, and H are the private
keys.
Signing: To sign a message M ,
1) i← i+ 1
2) e′ = γ(S−1h(h(M)|i))
3) if e′ is ⊥, go to Step 1).
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Output (M, e = e′(Q−1)T , i)
Verification:
Compute sˆ = H ′eT and s = h(h(M)|i).
The signature is valid if s and sˆ are equal.
The security of the CFS signature scheme is based on the hardness of solving a syndrome
decoding problem, which is known as an NP-complete problem [3].
Definition 1 (Syndrome decoding problem): Given an r×n parity check matrixH , a syndrome
s ∈ {0, 1}r, and an error correctability t > 0, find an error vector e in HeT = s with Hamming
weight of less than or equal to t.
In the signing process of the CFS signature scheme, the hashed message h(h(M)|i) with
counter i is treated as a syndrome. However, it is known that the ratio of successfully decodable
syndromes is only 1/t! for the case of the CFS signature scheme with binary t-error correcting
Goppa code [4]. Therefore, to obtain a valid signature, we need to search a valid error vector
by carrying out t! trial decodings on average, and thus t should be small.
In the proposed signature scheme, we consider another decoding method, called a complete
decoding problem, which is finding a nearest codeword to the received vector in the vector space.
Definition 2 (Complete decoding problem [4]): Given an r× n parity check matrix H and a
syndrome s ∈ {0, 1}r, find an error vector e with the minimumHamming weight in {e|HeT = s}.
Complete decoding problem is known as the most difficult computational problem in decoding
[18]. Complete decoding makes it possible to find an error vector with Hamming weight of greater
than t for the given syndrome at the cost of large computational complexity [11], [12]. However,
when we apply the complete decoding to the signing in the CFS signature scheme with binary
Goppa code, there is a limitation in that the value of δ in w = t+ δ cannot be sufficiently large.
In addition, there are some security drawbacks to the CFS signature scheme: (i) the parity
check matrix of high rate Goppa code can be distinguished from a random matrix, and thus
the CFS signature scheme is insecure under the EUF-CMA, and (ii) it has poor scaling of the
parameters based on the security as in the following description. The error correcting parameter t
needs to be small because the number of operations required for the generation of valid signature
is significantly dependent on t, that is, t!t2m3, where n − k = tm. The public key size of the
CFS scheme is (n − k)n = tm2m, and it is known that decoding attacks require A = 2tm/2
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operations. Thus the decoding attack complexity A is only a polynomial function of the key size
with small power, that is, A ≈ keysizet/2. Therefore, because t should be kept as a relatively
small value of up to 12 to reduce successful signing time, we need to significantly increase the
key size itself for higher security.
B. RM Code and Its Modification
In this paper, we proposed the CFS signature scheme using the modified RM codes. Because
the RM code and its modified one can be decoded through complete decoding, they can improve
the security drawback of the CFS signature scheme with binary Goppa code by extending the
error correctability t to the error weight parameter w.
1) RM Code: The Reed–Muller code, RM(r,m), of order r is a linear code defined by Boolean
functions for any integers m and r with 0 ≤ r ≤ m. A Boolean function of m variables can
be evaluated on 2m different positions, and thus the RM code has codewords of length 2m. The
RM code, RM(r,m), is a set of codewords obtained by evaluating all Boolean functions of a
degree of less than or equal to r. Thus, the length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d of
RM(r,m) are given as
n = 2m, k =
r∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
, d = 2m−r.
2) Complete Decoding of RM Code: Because the recursive decoding of the RM code can
find the coset leader of the received vector, this decoding can be considered as closest coset
decoding [12], [11]. In fact, closest coset decoding is the same as complete decoding. Therefore,
the RM code-based CFS signature scheme is worth considering. However, simply modifying
the CFS signature scheme by replacing it with an RM code is easily broken by the well-
known Minder-Shokrollahi and Chizhov-Borodin attacks, which are used in the RM code-based
McEliece cryptosystem [16]. With these attacks, the private keys S,H , and Q of the cryptosystem
can be obtained from the public key H ′ = SHQ. Therefore, we need to modify the RM code
structure to achieve security under known attacks, while maintaining the complete decodable
property of the RM code [16].
3) Puncturing RM Code with Random Insertion: In [16], the punctured RM code with random
insertion is introduced to construct a secure RM code-based public key cryptosystem. Similarly,
the puncturing and random insertion methods can be applied to an RM code-based signature
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scheme. In fact, the puncturing of a generator matrix G is equivalent to row and column deletions
of a parity check matrix H [19]. Because a signature scheme uses a parity check matrix H ,
the modified H with row and column deletions and random row insertion will be used for the
proposed signature scheme. The modification method of the (n, k) RM code is given as follows.
a) Row and Column Deletions of Parity Check Matrix
The systematic forms of generator and parity check matrices are given as
G = [Ik|P ], H = [P
T |In−k] (1)
where P is k × (n− k) matrix given as
P = [p1p2· · ·pn−k] (2)
with column vectors pi of size k. The generator matrix G can be punctured by deleting columns
of matrix P . Let P ′ be a p column deleted matrix from P . Then, the generator matrix and parity
check matrix of the punctured RM code are given as
Gp = [Ik|P
′], Hp = [P
′T |In−k−p], (3)
respectively. It can then be easily checked that
GpH
T
p = 0k×(n−k−p). (4)
b) Modification of Parity Check Matrix with Random Row Insertion
The punctured generator matrix Gp can be modified by inserting random columns into P
′.
Then, the punctured generator matrix with random column insertion is denoted as Gm = [Ik|P
′′],
where p random columns are inserted in P ′′. Then, the generator matrix and its parity check
matrix are given as
Gm = [Ik|P
′′], Hm = [P
′′T |In−k]. (5)
Clearly, we have GmH
T
m = 0k×(n−k).
III. NEW SIGNATURE SCHEME USING PUNCTURED RM CODE WITH RANDOM INSERTION
In this section, we propose a new code-based signature scheme, which is a modified version of
the CFS signature scheme based on punctured RM codes with random insertion. The proposed
signature scheme can improve the probability of successful signing, and guarantee EUF-CMA
security, which is composed of three stages, namely, key generation, signing, and verification,
as follows.
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Algorithm 1 [16] Puncturing procedure of generator matrix
Input: k × n generator matrix G of RM code
Output: index set LD
1. Randomly pick a minimum Hamming weight codeword x from C.
2. Randomly pick a minimum weight codeword y from projsupp(x)(C).
3. Choose p such that wt(y) ≤ p ≤ 2wt(y).
4. Randomly choose the set LD of indices such that supp(y) ⊆ LD and |LD| = p.
A. Proposed Signature Scheme
1) Key Generation
1-1) Puncturing with random insertion: Let G be a k × n generator matrix of the RM
code, RM(r,m). In this paper, we assume the systematic form of the RM code and LD is a set
of indices of puncturing positions in the parity part P of the systematic form of the generator
matrix, which was described for the nonsystematic RM code in Algorithm 1 [16]. The procedure
for puncturing generator matrix and determining the set LD is described in Algorithm 1, and
two important notations for Algorithm 1 are defined as follows.
Definition 3 ([16]): The support of a codeword c ∈ RM(r,m) is defined as the set of indices
i such that ci 6= 0, denoted as supp(c).
Definition 4 ([16]): Let c be a codeword of C and L be an index set. Then, projL(c) is a
sub-codeword composed of the components with indices in L from c. In addition, for a linear
code C, we define projL(C) = {projL(c)|c ∈ C}.
Because the puncturing procedure of the generator matrix of RM code is given in Algorithm
1, the parity check matrix H corresponding to G can be modified. Some of elements in LD
of Algorithm 1 may be in the information part I of the generator matrix G = [I|P ], but we
modify the generator matrix into the systematic form such that all elements of LD should be
in the parity part P . Using LD in Algorithm 1, a modification algorithm of the parity check
matrix corresponding to the punctured generator matrix is proposed in Algorithm 2, where the
systematic form of the generator matrix G = [I|P ] and the parity check matrix H = [P T |I] are
used.
Further, the generator and parity check matrices are row-scrambled and column-permuted to
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Algorithm 2 Modification of parity check matrix of punctured RM code in systematic form
Input: k × n generator matrix G = [I|P ] of the systematic form of RM code.
Output: modified parity check matrix Hm.
1. Let LD = {n− k− p+1, n− k− p+2, · · ·, n− k} be an row index set in the systematic
form of parity check matrix H = [P T |I] using p in Algorithm 1.
2. Replace the last p rows of the parity check matrix H by the binary random vectors ri,
n− k − p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n− k denoted as Hm, where
rij =


1, for j = i+ k
0, for n− p+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i+ k
random selection of binary bits, otherwise.
Hm =




P ′T In−k−p
R
0
Ip
n− k − p
p
k n− k − p p
Fig. 1. Modified parity check matrix of the proposed signature scheme.
generate the public key in the signature scheme. Thus, without a loss of generality, we can
assume that the last p columns of P in G are punctured, and thus we have LD = {n− k − p+
1, n− k− p+ 2, · · ·, n− k}. Therefore, the modification of the parity check matrix is described
in Algorithm 2.
Then, the modified parity check matrix Hm can be described as in Fig. 1, where R is a
p×(n−p) binary random sub-matrix with row vectors ri = (rij), n−k−p+1 ≤ i ≤ n−k, 1 ≤
j ≤ n− p, and P ′ is the last p column deleted version of P .
The deleted and inserted rows are not necessarily the same number as well as the same position
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



P ′T In−k−p
R
0
Ip
n− k − p
p
k n− k − p p e′1
.
.
.
e′n−p
r1
.
.
.
rp




=
s′1
.
.
.
s′n−k−p
s′n−k−p+1
.
.
.
s′n−k




Fig. 2. Signing process of the proposed signature scheme.
but here, we assume that they are the same.
1-2) Generation of S,Q, and Hm: Let S be an (n− k)× (n− k) scrambling matrix and Q
be an n× n permutation matrix. The public key is generated by calculating H ′ = SHmQ, and
the private keys are S,Hm, and Q.
2) Signing
For a message M , counter i, and hash function h, define the syndrome as s = h(h(M)|i),
which is the same as that of the CFS signature scheme.
2-1) Find the closest coset: Find the error vector e such that SHQeT = s. Let e′T = QeT
and s′ = S−1s. Then, He′T = s′. Decode the error vector e′ by the closest coset decoding.
2-2) Find the punctured part of the error vector: Because the parity check matrix H
is random row-deleted and inserted as Hm, we have to replace the last p elements of e
′ by
e′p = [r1, r2, · · ·, rp], denoted as e
′ = [e′n−p|e
′
p], such that Hme
′T = s′. Let s′ = [s′Tn−k−p|s
′T
p ]
T ,
where s′n−k−p and s
′
p denote the first n − k − p and last p elements of s
′, respectively. Then,
Hme
′T = s′ can be rewritten as
 [P ′T |In−k−p]e′Tn−p
Re′Tn−p + e
′T
p

 =

 s′n−k−p
s′p

 .
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Thus, we have
e′Tp = s
′
p +Re
′T
n−p
and thus e′ = [e′n−p|s
′
p +Re
′
n−p].
If the Hamming weight of e′ is larger than the error weight parameter w, then we increase
the counter i and apply the signing process again, where w is larger than the error correctability
t. The maximum number of iterations of the counter i is given as N , which will be discussed
in the next subsection.
If wt(e′) ≤ w, compute eT = Q−1e′T , and the signature σ is then given as σ = (M, e, i).
3) Verification
Check wt(e) ≤ w and H ′eT = h(h(M)|i). If TRUE, then return ACCEPT; else, return
REJECT.
B. Preprocessing for Error Weight Parameter
In the proposed signature scheme, choosing the error weight parameter w is significant for
balancing security level and time for successful signing, where w is larger than the error
correctability t. To determine what is the appropriate value of w in the proposed signature
scheme, we perform simulations for random syndromes. For N random syndromes s, we find
the minimum Hamming weight error vector e satisfying H ′eT = s by carrying out complete
decoding. The required number N of counters i, the corresponding error weight parameter w,
and probability of successful signing in the signing stage are listed in Table I.
Assume that N is the maximum number of signing trials for the successful signing in the
signing stage. The signing is successful if the complete decoded error weight is less than or
equal to w for the hashed message with counter i, h(h(M)|i). Let Xi be the Hamming weight
of error vector by the complete decoding for counter i. Then the probability of successful signing
is given as
prob
{
min
i≤N
(Xi) ≤ w
}
= 1− prob {X1 > w,X2 > w, · · ·, XN > w}
= 1− (prob{X1 > w})
N
(6)
where each Xi is assumed to be i.i.d. The probability prob{X1 > w} can be numerically obtained
by the distribution of Hamming weights of coset leaders in the complete decoding. Thus, N and
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Fig. 3. Distribution of Hamming weights of coset leaders among 107 in RM(10, 5).
TABLE I
THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL SIGNING FOR PARAMETERSN AND w IN RM(10, 5).
w \N 10,000 20,000 40,000
90 0.01 0.02 0.04
93 0.1 0.18 0.33
96 0.41 0.83 0.97
97 0.83 0.97 1
98 0.97 1 1
99 1 1 1
w can be selected for successful signing for the given RM code using (6). For RM(10, 5), the
distribution of Hamming weights of coset leaders is numerically obtained from Fig. 3, where
the minimum Hamming weight of error vectors among 107 random syndromes is 87. In Table I,
the probability of successful signing for RM(10,5) is listed for parameters N and w using (6).
From Table I, using the parameter w = 99, the probability of successful signing is almost
1 for N = 10000 in RM(10, 5). If we simulate for more syndromes, smaller weight of e can
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TABLE II
AN ERROR WEIGHT PARAMETER w AND THEIR SIGNING TIME FOR 10,000 RANDOM SYNDROMES.
(n, k, dmin)
Error weight parameter w
for successful signing
Successful
signing time
RM(10, 4) (1024, 386, 64) 192 2.26 sec
RM(10, 5) (1024, 638, 32) 97 2.21 sec
RM(11, 5) (2048, 1024, 64) 306 4.45 sec
RM(12, 5) (4096, 1586, 128) 855 9.50 sec
RM(12, 6) (4096, 2510, 64) 458 8.94 sec
be obtained at the cost of longer signing time. That is, if we choose the smaller error weight
parameter w and the larger N in the proposed signature scheme, the level of security becomes
higher, but the time for successful signing is increased. In Table II, the error weight parameter w
that can be successfully signed with N = 10, 000 trials and its signing time in a straightforward
implementation on Intel i7 Processor of 3.0 GHz for each RM code are described.
The proposed signature scheme is summarized as in Algorithm 3.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED CODE-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME
A. EUF-CMA
In this subsection, we prove that the proposed signature scheme is secure under EUF-CMA.
The proposed signature scheme can be simplified as follows. We can consider finding e satisfying
H ′eT = h(h(M)|i) as a signing process, where the parity check matrix of a linear code is Hm,
and γ is the decoding algorithm in the signature scheme in the previous section. Then, the
proposed signature scheme can be considered to be the same as the original CFS scheme for
the EUF-CMA security check.
1) Key Generation:
Let Hm be a parity check matrix of a modified RM code with the decoding algorithm γ.
Then, the private keys are S, Q, and Hm, and the public keys are H
′ = SHmQ and w.
2) Signing:
To sign a message M ,
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Algorithm 3 The proposed signature scheme
Preprocessing:
For a given modified (n, k) RM code and the security level larger than 128 bits, derive
(N,w) for successful signing as in Table I.
Key Generation:
Generate random matrices S, Q, and R.
Generate Hm as in Algorithm 2.
Compute H ′ = SHmQ.
Signing:
For i = 1 to N
Find syndrome s = h(h(M)|i) and compute s′ = S−1s.
Find e′ such that He′T = s′ by complete decoding.
Find e′p = s
′
p +Re
T
n−p and thus e
′ = [e′n−p|e
′
p].
If wt(e′) ≤ w, then goto *.
end
* Compute eT = Q−1e′T and thus signature is σ = (M, e, i).
Verification:
Check wt(e′) ≤ w and H ′eT = h(h(M)|i).
If True, then return ACCEPT, else return REJECT.
For i = 1 to N
e′ = γ(S−1h(h(M)|i))
if wt(e′) ≤ w, go to *.
end
* Output (M, e = e′(Q−1)T , i)
3) Verification
Check wt(e) ≤ w and H ′eT = h(h(M)|i). If TRUE, then return ACCEPT; otherwise, return
REJECT.
To prove the EUF-CMA security, we need the following assumption and proposition. The
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differences between the proposed signature scheme and the CFS signature scheme are; i) the
use of a different code, namely, a modified RM code rather than a Goppa code, and ii) the use
of complete decoding instead of syndrome decoding.
Assumption 5 (RM code distinguishability problem): There is no probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) distinguisher D that can distinguish H ′ = SHmP from a randomly generated parity check
matrix HR.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no known algorithms for distinguishing a modified
parity check matrix H ′ of an RM code from HR up to now, and thus we set the following
assumption.
Proposition 6 ([3] Hardness of complete decoding): The complete decoding problem for an
(n, k, t) linear code is an NP-complete problem if the Hamming weight of e is less than n/3.
With this assumption and proposition, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 7: The proposed modified RM code-based signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 7 is provided in Appendix.
B. Security by Error Weight Parameter
The attacker tries to forge the signature with public key H ′ and hashed message h(h(M)|i).
Assume that the public key H ′ is systematic, where H ′ = [H0|I], I is an (n−k)×(n−k) identity
matrix, and H0 is an (n − k) × k matrix. Then, attacker computes z satisfying the following
equation
H ′zT = [H0|I][z1|z2]
T = s = h(h(M)|i) (7)
where z1 and z2 are vectors with size k and n − k, respectively. The attacker can let z1 be an
all-zero vector and z2 = s. If the Hamming weight of z2 is less than or equal to w, then the
forgery is successful. The probability of successful forgery is given as
∑w
i=0
(
n−k
i
)
2n−k
, (8)
which is presented in Table III for each RM code and error weight parameters w of error vectors
given in Table I. However, for RM(11, 5) with w = 300, the probability of successful forgery is
less than 2−128 but it requires N = 200, 000 for successful signing. Then, the proposed signature
scheme using the RM(11, 5) code with w = 300 is considered to be 128 bit-secure.
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TABLE III
THE SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED SIGNATURE SCHEME FOR N = 10, 000.
(n, k, dmin, w)
∑
w
i=0 (
n−k
i
)
2n−k
RM(10, 4) (1024, 386, 64, 192) ≤ 2−74
RM(10, 5) (1024, 638, 32, 98) ≤ 2−70
RM(11, 5) (2048, 1024, 64, 306) ≤ 2−122
RM(12, 5) (4096, 1586, 128, 855) ≤ 2−186
RM(12, 6) (4096, 2510, 64, 458) ≤ 2−209
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new signature scheme based on the punctured RM code with
random insertion. The proposed signature scheme improves the Goppa code-based CFS signature
scheme by increasing the probability of successful signing using the complete decoding method.
In addition, the proposed signature scheme can avoid some known attacks for the RM code-based
cryptosystem using the puncturing method with random insertion. The optimal parameters of the
signing time and security were derived. It was also proved that the proposed signature scheme
achieves EUF-CMA security.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 7: The proof of this theorem is almost the same as the proof of the
EUF-CMA security of the CFS signature scheme [20]. It was proved in [20] that a variant of a
CFS scheme is EUF-CMA secure if certain assumptions are true. However, it was shown that
the assumption that distinguishing Goppa codes from random codes is difficult is not true for
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the case of some parameters (small t) used in the CFS signature scheme. Thus, we can follow
the logic of the proof in [20] because the adopted assumption for the proposed modified RM
code-based signature scheme is still valid. We define the sequence of games G0, G1, · · ·, G5 in
the same way as in [20]. Let G0 be the original security game, that is, the EUF-CMA game,
and G5 be solving the syndrome decoding problem.
The main differences between the proposed signature scheme and the CFS signature scheme
are mostly in Games G3 and G5. In the proof of the CFS signature scheme, Game G3 discusses
the Goppa code distinguishing problem, but for a small t, it turns out to be distinguishable
from a random code. In the case of the proposed signature scheme, we adopt the modified
RM code distinguishing problem in Assumption 5 because there has been no way to prove the
distinguishability up to now. Although Game G5 is related to the syndrome decoding problem in
the proof of the original CFS signature scheme, we will replace it using the complete decoding
problem, which is known as an NP-complete problem. A full description of this proof is given
as follows.
The challenger C plays a sequence of games G0, G1, · · ·, G5. Here, G0 corresponds to the
standard EUF-CMA game as mentioned above. In G0, the adversary A tries to forge a signature.
If the adversary A successfully forges the signature, then A wins the game G0. Successive
games are given through slight modifications of the preceding games. Let Pr[Gi] be the winning
probability of each game Gi. We then have to prove that the probability of the winning condition
of these games is proved to be arbitrarily small through all of the intermediate games.
G0: The challenger C obtains the private and public keys using a key generation algorithm.
The adversary A obtains the public key H ′, and can access a hash oracle H and signing oracle
Σ. Let qh and qs be the maximum numbers of queries made by the adversary A to the hash
oracle and the signing oracle, respectively. The procedure of G0 is given in Algorithm 4. Then,
the winning probability of G0 is given as
Pr[G0] = succ
EUF−CMA(A). (9)
G1: In this game, the challenger modifies the hash oracle H by H
′. In H′, the challenger uses
a list Λ that consists of counter values of i = Λ(M) for message M such that H(M, i) is a
decodable syndrome and another list ΛH to store a valid syndrome-error pair that was already
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Algorithm 4 G0 (EUF-CMA)
1) (H ′, S,H,Q)← keygen(C)
2) Set the oracles H and Σ
3) (M∗, σ∗, i∗)← AH,Σ(H ′)
4) If H(M∗, i∗) = H ′σ∗T ,wt(σ∗) ≤ w, and Σ did not provide σ∗, then
A wins the game
else
A loses the game
end
produced in the previous queries. If there is no element corresponding to the input, the output
is ⊥. The modified hash oracle H′ produces syndromes according to Algorithm 5, and finally
produces qh + qs + 1 syndromes. In addition, it is known that the relation of Pr[G0] and Pr[G1]
is given as
|Pr[G1]− Pr[G0]| ≤ ǫ0 (10)
where ǫ0 = 1−
(
1− 1
2n−k
)qh+qs+1
[20].
G2: In G2, the challenger replaces the signing oracle Σ with Σ
′. The modified signing oracle
queries H′ on (M,Λ(M)) according to Algorithm 6. In addition, the winning probability relation
of G1 and G2 is derived as
|Pr[G2]− Pr[G1]| ≤ ǫ1 (11)
where ǫ1 = 1−
(
1− qs
2n−k
)qh
.
G3: In G3, the challenger replaces the key generation algorithm with the selection of a random
binary parity check matrix. The selected parity check matrix is taken as the public key. Because
neither the hash oracle nor the signature oracle uses the hash function and the private keys, the
difference in the winning probabilities of G2 and G3 is the same as the distinguishing probability
between the modified RM code and a random binary code, that is,
|Pr[G3]− Pr[G2]| ≤ ǫdistinguish. (12)
By Assumption 5, the value of ǫdistinguish is negligible. The description of G3 is given as
Algorithm 7.
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Algorithm 5 Game G1 (H
′: simulation of H)
Input: a pair (M, i)
Output: a syndrome s
1) If Λ(M) =⊥, then
Λ(M)
R
←− {1, · · ·, 2n−k}
2) (s, e)← ΛH(M, i)
3) If i 6= Λ(M), then
If s =⊥, then
s
R
←− F n−k2
ΛH(M, i)← (s,⊥)
end
return H(M, i) = s
else
If s =⊥, then
e
R
←− {y ∈ F n2 |wt(y) ≤ w}
s← HeT
ΛH(M, i)← (s, e)
end
return H′(M, i) = s
end
G4: G4 is conditioned by an adversary making a forgery on a particular hash query. The
challenger first obtains a random c
R
←− {1, · · ·, qh+qs+1}. Adversary A wins the game if the cth
query to H′ is made on (M∗, i∗). Because c is randomly chosen from qh + qs + 1 possibilities,
the winning probability of G4 is given as
Pr[G4] =
Pr[G3]
qh + qs + 1
. (13)
G5: In this game, the challenger modifies the hash oracle to output a random syndrome s
∗ to
the cth query. The winning probability of G5 is the same as the winning probability of G4. The
detailed procedure for G5 is given in Algorithm 8. Note that this game is the same as solving
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Algorithm 6 Game G2 (Σ
′: simulation of Σ)
Input: a message M
Output: a signature (i, σ)
1) If Λ(M) =⊥, then
Λ(M)
R
←− {1, · · ·, 2n−k}
end
2) H′(M,Λ(M))
3) (s, x)← ΛH′(M,Λ(M))
4) Λ(M)←⊥
5) Return Σ(M) = (i, x)
Algorithm 7 Game G3
Input: a parity check matrix H
Output: a bit b
1) Given w, set the oracles H′ and Σ′
2) (M∗, σ∗, i∗)← AH
′,Σ′(H)
3) If H′(M∗, i∗) = Hσ∗T ,wt(σ∗) ≤ w, and Σ′ did not provide σ∗, then
b = 1
else
b = 0
end
the complete decoding problem. Then,
Pr[G5] = Pr[G4] ≤ ǫcomplete. (14)
From Proposition 6, the value of ǫcomplete is negligible.
Combining all of the above equations, (9)–(14), we have
succEUF−CMA(A) ≤ (qh + qs + 1)ǫcomplete + ǫdistinguish + ǫ0 + ǫ1. (15)
Hence, the probability of a successful forgery is negligible if the punctured RM codes with
random insertions are indistinguishable from random linear codes and the complete decoding
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Algorithm 8 Game G5
Input: an adversary A
1) c
R
←− {1, · · ·, qH + qΣ + 1}
2) H∗
R
←− (n, k) binary code for given w
3) s∗
R
←− F n−k2
4) Set the oracles H′ and Σ′
5) (M∗, σ∗, i∗)← AH
′,Σ′(H∗)
6) If


H′(M∗, i∗) = Hσ∗T
wt(σ∗) ≤ w
and


Σ′ did not provide σ∗
c− th query to H′ was (M∗, i∗),
then
A wins the game
else
A loses the game
end
problem is intractable. Thus, the proposed signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure.

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